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La Politique des Auteurs in British Film Studies: 
Traditional versus Structural Approaches 
 
Warren Buckland 
 
Abstract: This essay charts the emergence of auteur structuralism in Britain 
from 1967-76 and the polemical debates that erupted between its adherents 
(Jim Kitses, Peter Wollen, Alan Lovell) on the one hand, and Robin Wood, a 
defender of traditional auteur theory, on the other. The essay considers the 
epistemological values behind the debate, and ends by outlining the 
incompatible types of knowledge and evidence each side in the debate held. 
 
 
La politique des auteurs and film semiotics share an innovative way of 
conceptualizing and generating knowledge: each studies select properties of film 
using specific criteria from a particular standpoint. Cinema is not examined in its 
totality (as it is, for example, in Jean Mitry’s monumental and encyclopedic two-
volume Esthétique et psychologie du cinéma1), but is scaled down to a small series of 
questions and problems that emerge from one theoretical perspective. La politique des 
auteurs is a narrowly focused, evaluative form of film criticism that not only 
privileges the work of directors over other above-the-line filmmakers (screenwriters, 
cinematographers, producers, etc.), but also isolates a small, elite group of directors, 
conferring upon them the title of auteur. The specific object of analysis is comprised 
of one or two properties of film – style, themes – which are, furthermore, defined in 
terms of the criterion of consistency, for consistency signifies the director’s control 
and mastery over film. The semiotic theory that emerged out of the structural 
linguistics of Saussure systematically employs concepts (langue/parole, 
signifier/signified, syntagmatic relations/paradigmatic relations, arbitrariness, double 
articulation, etc.) to analyze one aspect of film (film as a sign system), rather than 
study the cinema ‘as such’ from an all-encompassing omniscient position. 
 
The success of this new epistemological perspective on film is measured in terms of 
its ability to focus, in a systematic and consistent way, only on specific properties of 
its object of study: in la politique des auteurs, the ability to identify consistent themes 
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and/or stylistic patterns in a director’s films; in semiotics, the ability to identify film’s 
level of signification, defined from a strict semiotic perspective. 
 
Empiricism vs Constructivism 
Yet, within this shared epistemology, a radical split can be detected – between an 
empiricist epistemology and a constructivist epistemology. Whereas an empiricist 
epistemology posits its object of study as pre-existing (already formed objects that 
generate knowledge when they are correctly observed, identified, and catalogued), the 
object of study in a constructivist epistemology is not given in advance and cannot, 
therefore, simply be observed, but is an abstract entity that needs to be constructed or 
modeled. The constructivist does not discover a specific object of study, but instead 
constructs it, for this object is defined as being inaccessible to perception. Saussure 
realized this in relation to the specific object of linguistic study when he stated that 
‘[f]ar from it being the object that antedates the viewpoint, it would seem that it is the 
viewpoint that creates the object’.2 Samuel Weber has said that ‘[t]his assertion marks 
out the epistemological space of Saussure’s theoretical effort, and to neglect its far-
reaching implications has inevitably meant to misconstrue the status of his 
arguments’.3 Saussure’s theoretical effort consists of developing a method that 
constitutes its object of study. Focus shifts to the significance of methodologies, for 
linguists need to follow the same methods in order to constitute the same object of 
study. 
 
In the realm of criticism, empiricism conceives its object as a work of art produced by 
an author, which embodies a primary, original meaning that the reader directly 
experiences, whereas constructivism (including structuralism and semiotics) instead 
conceives its object as a text that partly manifests an unobservable, abstract, 
underlying system of codes. The key object of study within a constructivist 
framework is this unobservable underlying system. Empiricists, by contrast, are 
skeptical of the existence of these unobservables. 
 
These two epistemological positions were played out in relation to auteur criticism in 
British film studies in the late 1960s-early 1970s. The next section will present this 
fertile period of British film culture chronologically, as manifest in publications, 
followed by a section detailing the polemics that erupted between the traditional 
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critics and the scholar theorists, together with the different types of knowledge and 
evidence held by each side of the debate. 
 
Traditional Auteur Criticism: Robin Wood 
Although François Truffaut initially formulated la politique des auteurs to identify 
and privilege a small number of French directors – Jean Renoir, Robert Bresson, Jean 
Cocteau, Jacques Becker, Abel Gance, Max Ophuls, Jacques Tati, and Roger 
Leenhardt4 – auteur criticism soon transformed the critical climate towards popular 
American cinema, for it promoted the serious study of Hollywood films – it expanded 
its purview to analyze Hollywood films with the same care and attention film critics 
used to praise European art films. Andrew Sarris translated la politique des auteurs 
into auteur theory for an American audience in the 1960s,5 while Robin Wood was 
key to disseminating auteur criticism in Britain around the same time, beginning with 
his book on Hitchcock in 1965, quickly followed by a short study of Arthur Penn in 
1967, and a study of Howard Hawks in 1968.6 Wood’s critical values are evident in 
the Introduction to his book on Hawks when he briefly discusses Red Line 7000 
(1965): 
 
What I really like about Red Line 7000 is the vital tension that is expressed 
throughout in the great complex of action, gesture, expression, speech, camera 
movement, camera placing, and editing, that is cinema: the sense of the film’s 
being the work of a whole man, intuitively and spontaneously, as well as 
intellectually, alive.7 
 
The extract begins with Wood simply expressing his liking for the film, but he 
justifies his evaluation using a series of direct observations of filmic techniques 
understood in terms of spiritual and humanist values. He celebrates the film’s ability 
to express what he regards as life’s moral dualism, or vital tension. He perceives life 
as a dynamic spiritual process oscillating between direct, spontaneous, intuitive, 
immediate experiences on the one hand and abstract rules and conventions on the 
other. Vital tension between the abstract and concrete creates the film’s sense of 
‘aliveness’, all the more significant for being expressed by a ‘whole man’, a director 
whose life embraces this dynamic conflict. Wood implicitly posits a seamless 
continuum between the director and the film, in which the film becomes the natural 
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expression of the director’s whole being. This extract also catalogues the concrete, 
directly observable components of mise en scène that Wood sees as expressing the 
film’s vital tension – from gestures to camera movement and editing. He views these 
components as forming an organic whole, interacting with each other to create the 
film’s overall thematic meanings. For the most part, Wood’s auteur studies focus on 
the thematic meanings and moral values in films rather than style and mise en scène 
per se. 
 
Wood’s language and his values derive in part from the liberal humanism of his 
teacher F.R. Leavis. In The Great Tradition, Leavis wrote that great writers (he names 
George Eliot, Henry James, and Joseph Conrad) have ‘a vital capacity for experience, 
a kind of reverent openness before life, and a marked moral intensity’.8 Similarly, in a 
discussion of poetry, Leavis noted that ‘all that we can fairly ask of the poet is that he 
shall show himself to have been fully alive in our time’.9 For Leavis, the successful 
writer lives life on an intense level, and expresses those experiences directly and 
effectively in his or her work. Similarly, reading literature requires an innate 
sensitivity to language and its ability to express experiences, human psychology, and 
moral values. To read literature, Leavis did not advocate the need for an explicit 
theory or method; instead, his liberal humanism posited an empiricism based on the 
close, direct, first hand reading of a poem or novel, and use of one’s innate sensibility, 
formed from a deep understanding of language and its use by a wide variety of writers 
in specific texts.  
 
Auteur Structuralism 
Focus on direct expression, first hand lived experience, primacy given to the 
individual, and a critical vocabulary of taste became anathema to critics and 
academics who adopted the methods of structuralism and semiotics in the 1960s. 
Structuralism, primarily in the form of Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology, 
tentatively filtered into auteur theory in the late 1960s, at the same time Wood’s 
traditional auteur studies were published. An initial acknowledgement of 
structuralism emerged in a short statement by Geoffrey Nowell-Smith in his book on 
Visconti, first published in 1967:  
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The purpose of criticism becomes therefore to uncover behind the superficial 
contrasts of subject and treatment a structural hard core of basic and often 
recondite motifs. The pattern formed by these motifs, which may be stylistic 
or thematic, is what gives an author’s work its particular structure, both 
defining it internally and distinguishing one body of work from another.10 
 
Auteurism is no longer conceptualized here as a search for the film’s creative source, 
but instead analyses distinctive structures internal to films. Nowell-Smith mentions 
that these structures can be either stylistic or thematic, although in practice he 
examined a few thematic oppositions in Visconti – opera/real life, opera/pop music, 
decadence/progress, idealism/realism. Yet, most of the book reads like a traditional 
auteur study – for example, this comment on La Terra Trema (1948) is typical: ‘It is 
in the choice of concrete and immediate determinations that Visconti reveals most 
clearly his own artistic personality’.11 Nowell-Smith expressed doubt in the feasibility 
of carrying out a completely structural analysis of a director’s work.12 
 
Alan Lovell’s chapter–length thematic reading of Don Siegel followed in 1968. 
Lovell identified a system of oppositions at work in Siegel’s world view: 
adventurer/society, crime/law, passion/control, anarchy/organization, and 
violence/tranquility.13 Lovell noted that he used structuralism in order to offer a 
precise description of the films, in opposition to an evaluation. What stands out today 
in Lovell’s reading is his clear-cut delineation of themes, rather than the structuralist 
methodology, which is used with a light touch. Structuralism is more evident in Jim 
Kitses’ Horizons West, a study of three directors of the Western (Budd Boetticher, 
Anthony Mann, and Sam Peckinpah).14 In this book-length study, Kitses has space to 
study the structural elements of the Western and a director’s manipulation of its 
conventions. He defines a genre as ‘a vital structure through which flow a myriad of 
themes and concepts’. He then delineates the director’s relation to the genre: ‘As such 
the form can provide a director with a range of possible connections and the space in 
which to experiment, to shape and refine the kind of effects and meaning he is 
working towards’.15 The director is not a free expressive agent; instead, he must 
constantly work against the Hollywood mode of production, which, for Kitses, means 
the director must work within and manipulate the pre-existing genre conventions and 
structures. 
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Nowell-Smith, Lovell, and Kitses from 1967-69 represent a transitional period for 
auteur structuralism, where structuralism was tentatively introduced into film studies. 
Auteur structuralism achieved a fuller statement in Peter Wollen’s chapter on auteur 
theory in his seminal book Signs and Meaning in the Cinema.16 In the Postscript to 
the 1972 edition, he noted that: ‘by a process of comparison with other films, it is 
possible to decipher […] a structure which underlies the film and shapes it, gives it a 
certain pattern of energy cathexis. It is this structure which auteur analysis 
disengages from the film’.17 Wollen employed Lévi-Strauss’ structural study of myth 
to analyze an auteur’s underlying structure (although technically it is more accurate to 
call the object of analysis an auteur’s underlying system). Yet, Wollen’s chapter is 
programmatic: it only applied structural analysis informally and schematically to the 
comedies and dramas of Howard Hawks, and more rigorously but still schematically 
to the Westerns of John Ford.  
 
Wollen sees Hawks’ films as falling into two mutually exclusive categories, which are 
the inverse of each other: Hawks’ claim as an author ‘lies in the presence, together 
with the dramas, of their inverse, the crazy comedies’, which represent ‘the agonized 
exposure of the underlying tensions of the heroic dramas’.18 A binary opposition 
therefore exists between Hawks’ adventure dramas and comedies. Because of this 
opposition, Wollen argues, Hawks’ corpus of films becomes rich.  
 
Wollen then shifts his attention to Ford’s Westerns, which he analyzes in structuralist 
terms by focusing on binary oppositions: ‘The most relevant are garden versus 
wilderness, ploughshare versus sabre, settler versus nomad, European versus Indian, 
civilised versus savage, book versus gun, married versus unmarried, East versus 
West’.19 ‘Wilderness versus garden’ is, according to Wollen, the ‘master antinomy in 
Ford’s films’20 – and, in fact, one of the master antinomies of American culture, 
structuring its founding myth. A second related antinomy is between nomad (living in 
the wilderness) and settler (in the cultivated garden).21 Both pairs feed into the quest 
for the Promised Land, a major theme in Ford’s films. In terms of heroes who rule in 
his new land, Wollen divides them into another binary opposition: rational legal 
authority versus charismatic authority. Wollen therefore identifies three binary 
oppositions dominant in Ford: wilderness/garden; nomad/settler; rational legal 
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authority/charismatic authority. He gives three examples, focusing on the heroes in 
The Searchers (1956), The Man Who Shot Liberty Valence (1962), and My Darling 
Clementine (1946). 
 
The traditional Romantic notion of the auteur theory is premised upon an expressive 
theory of causality. This traditional notion posits the director as a specific, purely 
subjective psychological cause, whose free will, desires, beliefs, and intentions 
consciously determine a film’s meaning. Structuralism opposes this psychological 
theory, particularly its solipsistic philosophy of the subject. A film’s meaning is not 
the product of an individual’s private consciousness freely creating, nor is it 
determined by a film’s relation to reality, but is the result of taking a small system of 
pre-existing signs and following pre-existing rules of combination and transformation 
to manifest a new permutation of signs. Structuralism therefore privileges the 
autonomous symbolic realm of language and signs, while downplaying individual 
subjectivity and reality as sources of meaning. What is important for auteur theory is 
that the structuralist location of meaning in language and other unconscious sign 
systems replaced the Romantics’ location of meaning in the private subjective 
experiences of an individual freely creating meaning. The structuralist’s approach to 
auteur theory redefines the status of director as auteur, by reducing the auteur to a 
specific structure that underlies and gives shape to their films.  
 
Wollen reminds us that it was Jean Renoir who said that a director spends his whole 
life making one film.22 Wollen uses Renoir’s comment to align auteur theory with a 
fundamental tenet of Lévi-Strauss’ structural study of myth: to conceive each film as 
a variant or incomplete version of a director’s ‘archi-film’, just as the anthropologist 
collects and studies variants of the same myth: ‘Underlying the different, individual 
tales was an archi-tale, of which they were all variants’.23 In his 1972 postscript, 
Wollen stresses that this ‘archi-film’ does not pre-exist analysis; instead, it is 
constructed a posteriori, just as there is no one true version of a myth, but several 
incomplete variants – and it is from those variants that the anthropologist constructs a 
synthesis, the archi-tale.  
 
Lévi-Strauss uses the term ‘analysis’ in its strict sense: a procedure that takes apart 
objects to reveal their ultimate constituents. Lévi-Strauss’ work is premised on a form 
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of structural analysis that reduces a heterogeneous array of observable surface 
phenomena (linguistic messages, myths, films, etc.) down to an underlying 
unobservable system of finite codes, which are rearranged into paradigms.24 A 
paradigm is a virtual, non-manifest set of associated or similar codes that can appear 
in the same place in a message. A code selected to be manifest in a message becomes 
a sign, and gains its meaning both in opposition to the codes in the paradigm that were 
not selected to be manifest and also from its syntagmatic relations to other signs 
manifest in the message.  
 
In sum, structural analysis defines meaning from an intrinsic rather than extrinsic 
perspective, and holistically, in terms of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations 
between codes and signs (rather than in terms of a sign’s one-to-one relation to a 
referent).25 Lévi-Strauss employed this structural method of analysis to identify 
paradigms within myths, a process that identifies the myths’ latent symbolic 
meanings. 
 
From the initial similarity of la politique des auteurs and film semiotics (delimited 
focus on specific properties of its object of study) to their epistemological opposition 
(empiricism vs constructivism), we now see an attempt at a synthesis, to bring 
traditional auteurism into the epistemological framework of structuralism and 
semiotics. This attempt generated a heated polemical debate. 
 
Polemics: Criticism vs Scholarship 
The polemics around auteurism that emerged in the late 1960s in the UK parallels the 
fierce debate between traditional literary historian Raymond Picard and ‘new school’ 
young Turk Roland Barthes in Paris in 1964, shortly after the publication of Barthes’s 
structural analysis of Racine.26 This debate (documented by Serge Doubrovsky27) 
galvanized the fundamental epistemological shift from an empiricist to a 
constructivist epistemology. This shift can also be characterized in terms of the 
opposition between ‘criticism’ and ‘scholarship’, with the traditional critics (Picard, 
Leavis, Wood) threatened by the rise of a professionalized class of academics trained 
in theory, which they applied reflexively to their chosen objects of study. Rather than 
evaluate individual works in their concrete specificity, literary theorists began 
positing unobservable abstract entities such as ‘literariness’, paradigms and syntagms, 
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la langue (and other systems of codes), narrative kernels/satellites, and connotative 
meanings.  
 
Nowell-Smith, Kitses, Lovell, and Wollen adopted structuralism to promote auteur 
theory to the level of scholarship – although Wollen still tried at first to use it for the 
purpose of criticism, to make value judgments. Whereas the Picard/Barthes debate 
was initiated by the publication of research written from an innovative perspective 
(Barthes’ structural analysis of Racine), in the UK it was the publication in 1968 of 
traditional criticism, Wood’s monograph on Hawks, that sparked the debate. Lovell’s 
essay ‘Robin Wood – A Dissenting View’28 reviews the book in order to attack the 
old orthodoxy of film criticism. Lovell finds no exposition of theory or method in 
Wood’s book, and a lack of reflexivity in the way he evaluates and applies moral 
values to films. Instead, the book simply consists of a series of assertions: ‘Too often I 
am confronted by a sense of nothing more than critical assertions. I am puzzled by 
Robin Wood’s conclusions and the way he reaches them’.29 Lovell traces this attitude 
back to Leavis’s influence on Wood. 
 
In place of this old critical orthodoxy, Lovell restated (from his study of Siegel) his 
non-evaluative descriptive approach to film auteurs:  
 
By the ‘auteur’ principle I understand a descriptive method which seeks to 
establish, not whether a director is a great director, but what the basic structure 
of a director’s work is. The assumption behind this principle is that any 
director creates his films on the basis of a central structure and that all of his 
films can be seen as variations or developments of it.30  
 
Lovell does not develop the idea of structure further, except to say it consists of 
themes, and that a structural analysis therefore involves identifying ‘thematic 
resemblances’ between a director’s films. 
 
Lovell’s structuralism is fairly modest, in terms of his shift to a constructivist 
epistemology, but sufficiently distinct from Wood’s form of film criticism. Lovell is 
more direct in his emphasis on analysis rather than evaluation (he uses the word 
‘description’, which still belongs to the terminology of empiricism; but the contrast 
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with evaluation remains). As with scholarship in general, he encourages reflexive 
research, whereby one’s theoretical premises, methods, and objects of analysis are 
made explicit. 
 
Wood’s response to Lovell, ‘Ghostly Paradigm and H.C.F.’,31 begins in typical 
fashion by challenging Lovell on the micro-level, pointing out his misinterpretations 
of and false attributions in particular sentences – although he also spends a great deal 
of time defending Leavis, and he briefly mentions the achievements of Wollen’s Signs 
and Meaning in the Cinema. When addressing Lovell’s theory and method, Wood 
does so by using the two phrases employed in his essay’s title, both of which 
reinforce his empirical epistemology. He characterizes the director’s basic structure, 
as posited by Lovell and Wollen, as nothing more than a ghostly paradigm, existing in 
an ideal Platonic world of non-material abstract Forms. Wood then uses the 
opportunity to reassert the need to engage with the concrete reality of individual 
films, a focus that characterizes all of his work. Secondly, he evokes the mathematical 
activity of factorization (finding the Highest Common Factor) as a way to 
characterize Lovell’s structural analysis: ‘Mr. Lovell is proposing, essentially, that we 
apply this principle to the cinema. Question: Find the H.C.F. of the films of Arthur 
Penn. Answer: unsocialized adolescent versus father-figure. As in Mathematics, it has 
its uses’.32 More generally, factorization is a form of reductionism, a defining trait of 
structuralism and semiotics, which reduce vast sums of variegated data (kinship 
structures, hundreds of diverse myths, narratives, images etc.) down to a small 
cohesive system of underlying invariant codes. Wood ends by asserting that the 
structural approach is unable to determine the value of a film. Lovell acknowledged 
this and bracketed out evaluation from structural analysis, while Wollen (who was the 
most successful in reformulating auteurism from the perspective of structuralism’s 
constructivist epistemology) initially employed it to carry out evaluation. 
 
However, Wood is not entirely dismissive of the structural method of film analysis. 
He claims to use it when grouping films together in his book on Hawks: 
 
I grouped Only Angels Have Wings, To Have and Have Not and Rio Bravo 
precisely because they reveal clearly the kind of common pattern or sub-
structure Mr. Lovell wants us to look for in a director’s work. Its recurrence 
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suggests its importance to Hawks, but not that the films in which it is most 
manifest are necessarily superior to those in which it is submerged or only 
marginally present.33 
 
Later in his reply, Wood says he regards the structural method simply as a tool, to be 
used and discarded at will. Such a non-committed attitude means he did not embrace 
structuralism’s constructivist epistemology, but instead simply regarded it as another 
empirical tool for classifying and grouping films. He did not see a contradiction 
between his focus on the concrete specificity of films and the ruthlessly reductive 
agenda of structuralism to isolate from films a deep underlying abstract structure. This 
is evident in the above quotation, where he understands structure simply as an 
observable surface detail, a ‘common pattern’ in the three Hawks films, which he 
attributes directly to Hawks’ intentionality (‘Its recurrence suggests its importance to 
Hawks’). 
 
Alan Lovell responded to Wood a year later in ‘The Common Pursuit of Pure 
Judgement’.34 He used the opportunity to develop a more trenchant critique of both 
Leavis and Wood, arguing that ‘I wanted to shift the emphasis from the critic to 
criticism, from personal qualities to impersonal ones, from moral qualities to 
intellectual ones’.35 This is a clear statement of the rise of a professionalized class of 
academics trained in impersonal, intellectual theory replacing the old traditional 
critics writing criticism in terms of their own personal moral values.36  
 
In 1976 Wood took up the debate again, this time in book form. In the opening 
chapter of Personal Views: Explorations in Film, he responded to Lovell’s challenge 
to spell out his own critical values. He begins by distinguishing his work from 
abstract theory, and reaffirms his previous remarks about privileging the critic’s 
personal engagement with individual works, guided by an openness to experience 
rather than a set of theoretical doctrines. From this open-minded, personal experience, 
he argues, the critic is able to evaluate a work’s aesthetic and moral values. As a 
critic, Wood says he draws upon ‘absolute human qualities’ such as generosity, 
tolerance, intelligence, creativity, sensitivity, tenderness, and compassion.37 These 
personal qualities are supplemented with a focus on a work of art’s coherence, which, 
Wood emphasizes, ‘is only meaningful in conjunction with concepts like 
 12 
“complexity,” “density,” “inner tensions”; it can never be an absolute criterion’.38 A 
complex work of art needs to overcome insurmountable obstacles to achieve 
coherence, increasing its value if it is successful, in opposition to a simple work of art, 
which can achieve coherence more easily – although Wood privileges complex works 
of art that strive for (without reaching) coherence over simple works that do achieve 
coherence. This is because, Wood argues, complex artworks present sophisticated 
insights into human experience, and those that fail to achieve coherence are still 
valuable because they attempt to express previously unarticulated experiences. Wood 
cites chapters 6 and 7 of D. H. Lawrence’s novel The Rainbow as uneven but 
nonetheless invaluable for their ‘intensive exploration of areas of experience 
previously untouched in literature’.39 In sum, Wood’s critical values privilege an 
organic understanding of an artwork as a living whole, and the way that whole is 
presented to the critic’s consciousness for contemplation and moral evaluation. 
 
In another chapter of Personal Views, ‘Hawks De-Wollenized’,40 Wood launched a 
full-on assault of Wollen’s auteur chapter in Signs and Meaning in the Cinema. His 
main target is Wollen’s reductionism, which, Wood argues via several examples, 
leads to inflexible criticism that misses or distorts the subtlety of individual films and 
scenes in Hawks’ films. Wood attributes this distortion to Wollen’s structuralist 
method and its excessively abstract approach to film criticism. ‘Are we interested in 
works of art’, Wood asks, ‘or in the abstractions that can be made from an artist’s 
work? My answer is that for me art is concrete and specific’.41 Wood’s main response 
to the abstractions of structuralist theory is to cite another example from a specific 
film. A different answer to his question would be one in which there is more to art 
than a critic’s personal response to it, however well that response may be articulated 
in criticism. Privileging personal views can become confessional and 
autobiographical, which can ultimately lead to solipsism. William Van Wert presents 
the following example from Wood: 
 
I have come to feel, during the past few years, that Sansho The Bailiff and 
Tokyo Story may be superior to any American film I know — superior even to 
Vertigo, to Rio Bravo, to Letter From an Unknown Woman — superior in a 
greater maturity of vision, and in the completeness and conscious authority 
with which that vision is realized.42 
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Van Wert asks how do we measure ‘maturity of vision’, ‘completeness’, and 
‘conscious authority’ except in relation to Wood’s own personal development in the 
past few years. In place of this ‘freelance facile criticism’, Van Wert argues for ‘a 
working methodology for viewing films’, that is, a series of formulated methods that 
can serve as a reference point that critics can follow. That is, he argues for a shift 
from a first person perspective to an impersonal or third person perspective. 
 
First and Third Person Perspectives 
The structuralist revolution decisively overturned this philosophy of consciousness, 
which reduces existence to consciousness, and replaced it with impersonal symbolic 
structures.  Structuralism initiated a radical critique of the ‘first person perspective’ 
(focus on introspection, or private mental events) and replaced it with the public, 
‘third person perspective’ of language and signs. Prior to structuralism, conscious 
mental processes were regarded as the foundation of knowledge (including self-
knowledge). ‘However’, writes Thomas Daddesio, ‘once this privilege came to be 
viewed as illusory, introspection was replaced by methods relying on a third-person 
perspective. From this new perspective, the access individuals have to their own 
thoughts could no longer be taken as the foundation for knowledge and, consequently, 
private events were replaced, in discussions of language, meaning, and reason, by 
events that were open to public scrutiny such as the behavior of others, the words they 
utter, and the uses to which they put words’.43 The structuralists’ assumption of 
indirect access to one’s thoughts via language and other intersubjective sign systems 
replaced the misguided, first person assumption of immediate access to the thoughts 
in one’s own mind. 
 
When Wood says he employs structuralism as a tool, he misperceives this 
fundamental shift from the first to third person perspective. He again downplays the 
constructivist epistemology of structuralism, for he views it only within his own 
empiricist epistemology. Both Wood and Wollen study films intrinsically, but Wood 
adopted a traditional thematic reading that isolated implicit meanings, viewed as pre-
existing meanings that need to be unearthed, while Wollen isolated a more abstract 
structure of themes. Meaning does not emerge simply from the content of themes, but 
from a web of signification – from the syntagmatic relations and paradigmatic 
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oppositions between themes. These structural relations do not have the same 
epistemological status as the themes; they do not pre-exist in some fully formed state 
and cannot, therefore, be simply read from the film, but are constructed and modeled. 
Structuralism analyses themes in terms of a logic of difference rather than a logic of 
identity, in terms of the structural relations between what is manifest in a film and 
what is not manifest, rather than in terms of manifest, self-sufficient content.  
 
The traditional and structural schools of auteurism therefore have incompatible 
standards for what counts as knowledge and what counts as evidence. They 
fundamentally disagree on what properties of film to focus on; whether auteurism is a 
form of criticism or scholarship; the role of the individual in creating and 
understanding films; and whether films are conceived as expressive works of art or as 
impersonal texts. Traditional auteurism relies on observation and experience as 
sources of knowledge, together with classification and comparison. It is premised on 
the Romantic notion of a subjective, pre-rational authentic intuition, one that 
spontaneously expresses interior human meanings ignored by rationalism. For auteur 
structuralism, the source of meaning is the unobservable system of codes that pre-
exist messages and interlocutors. Rather than direct observation and experience, 
knowledge derives from the construction of models. Traditional auteurism operates at 
a low level of abstraction from the data, whereas auteur structuralism operates at a 
high level of abstraction. 
 
Within polemical disputes involving different epistemological positions, the 
proponents talk past one another; they translate the concepts from one paradigm into 
their own paradigm before criticizing them, leaving the opponent open to the charge 
of distortion and misrepresentation. But this is common in polemical disputes – 
indeed, it is the precondition of the dispute. 
 
Wood’s concrete counter-examples to Wollen’s abstractions simply miss the mark. 
Wollen is not trying to imitate traditional auteur criticism in its attention to the surface 
specificities of individual films; instead, he is discarding that empirical type of 
auteurism and is reconfiguring auteurism from a structuralist perspective. So when 
Wood cites individual films to counter Wollen, the effort is wasted, for these counter-
examples belong to the paradigm Wollen is discarding. Both authors are working 
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within different epistemological positions, each with their own intellectual 
presuppositions.  
 
Yet, Wollen initially wrote traditional auteur criticism before the publication of Signs 
and Meaning in the Cinema, in a series of essays published in the New Left Review in 
the mid-1960s (and subsequently published in later editions of Signs and Meaning in 
the Cinema). The significance of his auteur structuralism lies in his ability to work 
within one paradigm before supplanting it with another paradigm. In his subsequent 
work in the 1980s, Robin Wood did not so much transform his own criticism, but 
expanded it. He remained committed to the individual consciousness and to writing 
about individual films, but from a political perspective. In Hollywood from Vietnam to 
Reagan, published in 1986, he mentioned his previous ‘critical innocence (or culpable 
ignorance, as you will) – innocence, above all, of concepts of ideology, and of any 
clearly defined political position’.44 In the 1980s, he wrote new essays and re-
evaluated his previous auteur studies to determine ‘how individual films dramatize, as 
they inevitably must, the conflicts that characterize our culture: conflicts centered on 
class/wealth, gender, race, sexual orientation’.45 Wood and Wollen therefore 
demonstrate two different modes of transformation – Wollen shifted auteurism to a 
new paradigm, while Wood gradually expanded it to include politics as an essential 
dimension of his film criticism. 
  
I wish to thank Pete Boss for his comments on an earlier version of this essay. 
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